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Discrete-time Risk-sensitive Mean-field Games
Naci Saldi, Tamer Bas¸ar, and Maxim Raginsky ∗
Abstract
In this paper, we study a class of discrete-time mean-field games
under the infinite-horizon risk-sensitive discounted-cost optimality
criterion. Risk-sensitivity is introduced for each agent (player) via an
exponential utility function. In this game model, each agent is cou-
pled with the rest of the population through the empirical distribu-
tion of the states, which affects both the agent’s individual cost and
its state dynamics. Under mild assumptions, we establish the exis-
tence of a mean-field equilibrium in the infinite-population limit as
the number of agents (N) goes to infinity, and then show that the pol-
icy obtained from the mean-field equilibrium constitutes an approxi-
mate Nash equilibrium when N is sufficiently large.
1 Introduction
This paper deals with discrete-time mean-field games under the
infinite-horizon risk-sensitive discounted-cost optimality criterion,
where risk-sensitivity is introduced via an exponential utility function
(see [3, 4, 12, 22]). Mean-field game theory studies non-cooperative
stochastic dynamic games with a large number of agents, who are
coupled through their dynamics and cost functions via the mean-field
term (i.e., the empirical distribution of their states). If the agents are
identical (that is, they enter the game symmetrically), as the popula-
tion goes to infinity, the mean-field term converges to a deterministic
probability distribution by the law of large numbers, which results
in the decoupling of agents from each other. Due to this decoupling,
in the infinite-population regime, each agent is faced with a classical
stochastic control problem subject to a constraint on the distribution
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of the state at each time. This constraint dictates that the state distri-
bution should be consistent with the total population behavior; that
is, at each time step, the law of the state must be the same as the lim-
iting law of the mean-field term. Therefore, in the infinite-population
case, the problem turns into one of establishing the existence of a pol-
icy and a state distribution flow such that this policy is an optimal
solution of the stochastic control problem when the total population
behavior is modeled by this state distribution flow and the resulting
distribution of each agent’s state is same as the state distribution flow
when the generic agent applies this policy. This equilibrium — also
known as mean-field equilibrium — behavior between policy and state
distribution flow is captured by the Nash certainty equivalence (NCE)
principle ( [25]). Then, the solution of this single-agent decision prob-
lem provides an approximation to Nash equilibrium of games with
large (but finite) population sizes.
The purpose of this paper is to establish, in discrete time, the ex-
istence of mean-field equilibrium for a general class of mean-field
game models with risk-sensitive discounted-cost criteria and to show
that the policy in the mean-field equilibrium constitutes an approxi-
mate Nash equilibrium for finite-agent games with sufficiently many
agents.
Mean-field game theory has been introduced independently by
[25] and [29] to establish approximate Nash equilibria for continuous-
time non-cooperative differential games with a large number of iden-
tical agents. As roughly explained above, the key underlying idea is
that, under the Nash certainty equivalence principle, the decentral-
ized game problem can be reduced to a single-agent decision prob-
lem and the equilibrium solution of this decision problem constitutes
an approximate Nash equilibrium for games with a sufficiently large
number of agents. Characterization of this equilibrium solution leads
to a Fokker-Planck (FP) equation that describes the total mass behav-
ior and a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation that describes the
optimal solution corresponding to this total mass behavior. We refer
the reader to [5, 10, 11, 19, 23, 24, 32, 41] for studies of continuous-time
mean-field games with different models and cost functions, such as
games with major-minor players, risk-sensitive games, games with
Markov jump parameters, and LQG games.
In the literature, relatively few results are available on discrete-
time mean-field games. Prior works have mostly studied the setup
where the state space is discrete (finite or countable) and the agents
are coupled only through their cost functions. [18] consider a discrete-
time mean-field game with a finite state space over a finite horizon.
A discrete-time mean-field game with countable state-space is stud-
ied in [1], under an infinite-horizon discounted cost criterion. [7] con-
siders the average-cost setting, where the state space is a σ-compact
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Polish space and the agents are coupled only through their cost func-
tions. Discrete-time mean-field games with linear individual dynam-
ics are studied in [17, 30, 31, 34]. We note that all existing works in the
discrete-time setup deal with risk-neutral cost functions. Indeed, our
work appears to be the first one that studies discrete-time mean-field
games within the risk-sensitive framework.
Prior works on risk-sensitive mean-field games have mostly stud-
ied the continuous-time setup, and it is known that analyses of
continuous-time and discrete-time setups are quite different, requir-
ing different sets of tools. [41] studies a continuous-time mean-field
game with nonlinear individual dynamics and a risk-sensitive cost
function. Tembine et al. characterize the mean-field equilibrium
via coupled HJB and FP equations and explicit solutions to these
equations are given when the individual state dynamics are linear.
[40] considers a continuous-time mean-field game with nonlinear in-
dividual dynamics, where state dynamics have Lp-norm structure.
Stochastic maximum principle is used to characterize the optimal so-
lution of the problem. [15] studies partially-observed version of the
continuous-time risk-sensitive mean-field game. Djehiche and Tem-
bine establish a stochastic maximumprinciple for the characterization
of the mean-field equilibrium. [30, 33] consider continuous-time risk-
sensitive mean-field games with linear individual dynamics. First a
generic risk-sensitive optimal control problem is solved which yields
mean-field equilibrium and then it is shown that the policies in mean-
field equilibrium lead to an approximate Nash equilibrium for games
with a sufficiently large number of agents. It is also shown that this
approximate Nash equilibrium is partially equivalent to the approxi-
mate Nash equilibrium of a certain robust mean-field game problem.
This paper deals with discrete-time risk-sensitive mean-field
games with Polish state and action spaces and with bounded one-
stage cost functions. The generic cost function of each player is ex-
ponential utility of an infinite-horizon discounted-cost function. In
this gamemodel, the agents are coupled through the mean-field term,
which affects both the individual dynamics and one-stage cost func-
tions. In the infinite-population case, a generic agent is faced with a
non-homogenous risk-sensitive stochastic control problem under the
NCE principle. Due to NCE principle, the classical techniques used
to study risk-sensitive stochastic control problems are not sufficient
to establish the existence of a mean-field equilibrium. To do this, we
have to employ the fixed-point approach that is used to obtain equi-
libria in classical game problems, along with the dynamic program-
ming recursion for risk-sensitive costs. In Section 2, we formulate the
finite-agent discrete-time risk-sensitive game problem of the mean-
field type. In Section 3, we introduce the infinite-population mean-
field game and define mean-field equilibrium. In Section 4, we prove
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the existence of a mean-field equilibrium. In Section 5 we establish
that the mean-field equilibrium policies lead to an approximate Nash
equilibrium for finite-agent games with sufficiently many agents. Sec-
tion 6 lists some directions for future research.
In [38] we have studied the risk-neutral version of this problem
under a similar set of assumptions on the system components. At
the higher level, the techniques used in this paper to show the ex-
istence of a mean-field equilibrium and to prove that the policies in
mean-field equilibrium provide an approximate Nash equilibrium for
games with sufficiently many agents are almost the same as in [38];
however there are some highly non-trivial technical differences be-
tween the analysis of risk-sensitive and risk-neutral cost functions.
For instance, in the risk-neutral case, the cost function is in an additive
form, and this results in a contractive dynamic programming opera-
tor. However, in the risk-sensitive case, the cost function is in a mul-
tiplicative form, and therefore, the dynamic programming operator is
not contractive, which complicates the analysis. Indeed, to establish
the existence of a mean-field equilibrium, we need to first establish
an optimality criterion for non-homogenous risk-sensitive stochastic
control problems, which is absent in the literature. In the risk-neutral
case, this optimality result has already been established. Moreover, as
opposed to the risk-neutral case, we prove the existence of approxi-
mate Nash equilibrium by transforming the original problem into an
equivalent one using a certain state-aggregation technique. This also
brings in additional complexity to the analysis, which is unavoidable.
Notation. For a metric space Ewith metric dE, we let Cb(E) denote the
set of all bounded continuous real functions on E, and P(E) denote
the set of all Borel probability measures on E. For any E-valued ran-
dom element x, L(x)( · ) ∈ P(E) denotes the distribution of x. A se-
quence {µn} ofmeasures on E is said to convergeweakly to ameasure
µ if
∫
E
g(e)µn(de)→
∫
E
g(e)µ(de) for all g ∈ Cb(E). For any ν ∈ P(E)
andmeasurable real function g on E, we define ν(g) :=
∫
gdν. For any
subset B of E, we let ∂B and Bc denote the boundary and complement
of B, respectively. The notation v ∼ νmeans that the random element
v has distribution ν. Unless otherwise specified, the term “measur-
able" will refer to Borel measurability.
2 Finite Player Game Model
In this paper, we study a discrete-time N-agent infinite-horizon
stochastic game of mean-field type with a Polish state space X and
a Polish action space A. The dynamics of each agent are governed by
an initial state distribution µ0 ∈ P(X) and a state transition kernel
p : X× A×P(X) → P(X) as follows. For every t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .} and
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every i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,N}, let xNi (t) ∈ X and aNi (t) ∈ A denote, respec-
tively, the state and the action of Agent i at time t, and let
e
(N)
t ( · ) :=
1
N
N
∑
i=1
δxNi (t)
( · ) ∈ P(X)
denote the empirical distribution of the states at time t, where δx ∈
P(X) is the Dirac measure at x. For t = 0, (xN1 (0), . . . , xNN(0)) are
independent and identically distributed according to µ0, and, for each
t ≥ 0, transition to the next-state configuration (xN1 (t+ 1), . . . , xNN(t+
1)) is distributed according to the probability law
N
∏
i=1
p
(
dxNi (t+ 1)
∣∣xNi (t), aNi (t), e(N)t ). (1)
Here, the dynamics of each agent are weakly coupled through the
mean-field term e
(N)
t . In the infinite population limit, N → ∞, we see
that, at each time step t, the empirical distribution e
(N)
t converges to
some deterministic probability measure µt by the law of large num-
bers, and so, this coupling vanishes.
The next step is to specify how the agents select their actions at
each time step. To that end, we introduce the history spaces H0 =
X×P(X) and Ht = (X× A×P(X))t × (X×P(X)) for t = 1, 2, . . ., all
endowedwith product Borel σ-algebras. We endow the set P(X)with
the topology of weak convergence, which makes it a Polish space. A
policy for a generic agent is a sequence π = {πt} of stochastic kernels
on A given Ht; we say that such a policy is Markov if each πt is a
Markov kernel on A given X. The set of all policies for Agent i is
denoted by Πi, and the subset consisting of all Markov policies by
Mi. Furthermore, we let M
c
i denote the set of all Markov policies for
Agent i that are weakly continuous; that is, π = {πt} ∈ Mci if for all
t ≥ 0, πt : X → P(A) is continuous when P(A) is endowed with the
weak topology. Let
Π
(N) =
N
∏
i=1
Πi, M
(N) =
N
∏
i=1
Mi, andM
(N,c) =
N
∏
i=1
M
c
i .
We let pi(N) := (π1, . . . ,πN), πi ∈ Πi, denote the N-tuple of policies
for all the agents in the game, which will be referred to simply as a
‘policy.’ Under such a policy, the actions of agents at each time t ≥ 0
are generated according to the probability law
N
∏
i=1
πit
(
daNi (t)
∣∣hNi (t)), (2)
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where
hNi (0) = (x
N
i (0), e
(N)
0 ) and h
N
i (t) = (h
N
i (t− 1), xNi (t), aNi (t− 1), e(N)t )
for t ≥ 1 are the local histories observed by Agent i at each time step.
When pi(N) ∈ M(N), (2) becomes
N
∏
i=1
πit(da
N
i (t)|xNi (t)).
The stochastic transition kernels in (1) and (2), together with the initial
state distribution µ0, uniquely determine the probability law of all the
states and actions for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,N} and all t ≥ 0. We will denote
expectations with respect to this probability law by Epi
(N)[ · ].
We now define the optimality criterion for the problem. The
one-stage cost function for a generic agent is a measurable function
c : X × A × P(X) → [0,∞). For Agent i, we introduce "risk sen-
sitivity" into the objective function of the agent. Accordingly, the
agent’s infinite-horizon risk-sensitive cost under the initial distribu-
tion µ0 and a policy pi
(N) ∈ Π(N) is given by
V
(N)
i (pi
(N)) =
1
λ
log
(
Epi
(N)
[
eλ ∑
∞
t=0 β
tc(xNi (t),a
N
i (t),e
(N)
t )
])
,
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor and λ > 0 is the risk factor. By
using Taylor series expansion of V
(N)
i (pi
(N)) around λ = 0, we note
that to first order in λ,
V
(N)
i (pi
(N)) ≈
(
Epi
(N)
[ ∞
∑
t=0
βtc(xNi (t), a
N
i (t), e
(N)
t )
]
+
λ
2
Varpi
(N)
[ ∞
∑
t=0
βtc(xNi (t), a
N
i (t), e
(N)
t )
])
,
where Var[ · ] denotes the variance of a random variable (see [4, p.
107]). Here, the second term in this expansion penalizes the variation
of the cost around its mean value. Note that when λ → 0, the cost
functionV
(N)
i (pi
(N)) corresponds to the (risk-neutral) infinite-horizon
discounted cost.
Since 1λ log(·) is a strictly increasing function, without loss of gen-
erality, for the game we consider only the part with expectation:
J
(N)
i (pi
(N)) = Epi
(N)
[
eλ ∑
∞
t=0 β
tc(xNi (t),a
N
i (t),e
(N)
t )
]
.
Next, we introduce the equilibrium solution for the game, which is
Nash equilibrium:
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Definition 1. A policy pi(N∗) = (π1∗, . . . ,πN∗) constitutes a Nash equi-
librium for the N-player game, if
J
(N)
i (pi
(N∗)) = inf
π i∈Πi
J
(N)
i (pi
(N∗)
−i ,π
i)
for each i = 1, . . . ,N, where pi
(N∗)
−i := (π
j∗)j 6=i.
As explained in detail in [38], for the risk-neutral game, there
are two challenges to obtain Nash equilibria in mean-field games
considered here: the (almost) decentralized nature of the informa-
tion structure of the problem and the so-called curse of dimensionality
(the solution of the problem becomes intractable when the number of
states/actions and agents is large). Therefore, it is of interest to find
an approximate decentralized equilibrium with reduced complexity.
To that end, we define the following.
Definition 2. A policy pi(N∗) ∈ M(N) is aMarkov-Nash equilibrium if
J
(N)
i (pi
(N∗)) = inf
π i∈Mi
J
(N)
i (pi
(N∗)
−i ,π
i)
for each i = 1, . . . ,N, and an ε-Markov-Nash equilibrium (for a given
ε > 0) if
J
(N)
i (pi
(N∗)) ≤ inf
π i∈Mi
J
(N)
i (pi
(N∗)
−i ,π
i) + ε
for each i = 1, . . . ,N.
Note that, according to this definition, the agents can only use their
current local state information xNi (t) to design their policies. Indeed,
in practical applications, due to memory and computational con-
straints, agents typically have access only to their current local state
information. In addition, in the discrete-time mean field literature, it
is common to establish the existence of approximate Nash equilibria
with local (decentralized) information structures (see [1] [7]).
In this paper, we prove, for the risk-sensitive game just formu-
lated, the existence of the ε-Markov-Nash equilibria for games with
sufficiently many agents using mean-field approach. We follow the
steps in the risk-neutral version of the problem [38], with however
some subtle differences in the risk-sensitive case. Accordingly, we
first consider the infinite population limit and prove the existence of
equilibrium. Then, for the finite-N case, we show that, if each agent
adopts the equilibrium policy in the infinite population limit, then the
resulting policy will be an approximateMarkov-Nash equilibrium for
all sufficiently largeN. It is important to note that, although the policy
in the mean-field equilibrium is an approximate Markov-Nash equi-
librium for the finite-agent game problem, it is indeed a true Nash
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equilibrium in the infinite population regime. This follows from the
fact that the set of Markov policies is sufficiently rich for optimality in
the limiting case, as each agent is faced with a single-agent decision
problem.
3 Mean-field games and mean-field equilib-
ria
In this section, we introduce the infinite population limit of the orig-
inal game introduced in the preceding section. This game is referred
to as mean-field game and its equilibrium is called mean-field equi-
librium. Mean-field games are not games in the classical sense: they
are single-agent stochastic control problems whose state distribution
at each time step should satisfy a certain consistency condition. In
other words, we have a single agent and model the overall behavior
of (a large population of) other agents (i.e., empirical distribution of
the states) by an exogenous state-measure flow µ := (µt)t≥0 ⊂ P(X)
with a given initial condition µ0. By the law of large numbers, this
measure flow µ should also be consistent with the state distributions
of this single agent when the agent acts optimally. The precise math-
ematical description of the problem is given as follows.
The mean-field game model for a generic agent is specified by(
X,A, p, c, µ0
)
,
where, as before, X and A are the Polish state and action spaces, re-
spectively. The stochastic kernel p : X × A × P(X) → P(X) de-
notes the transition probability. The measurable function c : X× A×
P(X)→ [0,∞) is the one-stage cost function and µ0 is the distribution
of the initial state.
Define the history spaces G0 = X and Gt = (X × A)t × X for
t = 1, 2, . . ., all endowed with product Borel σ-algebras. A policy is
a sequence π = {πt} of stochastic kernels on A given Gt. The set of all
policies is denoted by Π. A Markov policy is a sequence π = {πt} of
stochastic kernels on A given X. The set of Markov policies is denoted
byM.
We define the set of all state-measure flows with a given initial
condition µ0 asM :=
{
µ ∈ P(X)∞ : µ0 is fixed
}
. Given any measure
flow µ ∈ M, the probabilistic evolution of the states and actions of a
generic agent are as follows
x(0) ∼ µ0,
x(t) ∼ p( · |x(t− 1), a(t− 1), µt−1), t = 1, 2, . . .
a(t) ∼ πt( · |g(t)), t = 0, 1, . . . ,
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where g(t) ∈ Gt is the state-action history up to time t. According to
the Ionescu Tulcea Theorem (see, e.g., [21]), an initial distribution µ0
on X, a policy π, and a state-measure flow µ define a unique proba-
bility measure Pπ on (X× A)∞. The expectation with respect to Pπ is
denoted by Eπ. A policy π∗ ∈ Π is said to be optimal for µ if
Jµ(π
∗) = inf
π∈Π
Jµ(π),
where the infinite-horizon risk-sensitive cost of policy πwithmeasure
flow µ is given by
Jµ(π) := E
π
[
eλ ∑
∞
t=0 β
tc(x(t),a(t),µt)
]
.
Using this definition, we first define the set-valued mapping
Ψ :M→ 2Π
as Ψ(µ) = {π ∈ Π : π is optimal for µ}.
Conversely, we define a single-valued mapping
Λ : Π →M
as follows: given π ∈ Π, the state-measure flow µ := Λ(π) is con-
structed recursively as
µt+1( · ) =
∫
X×A
p( · |x(t), a(t), µt)Pπ(da(t)|x(t))µt(dx(t)),
where Pπ(da(t)|x(t)) denotes the conditional distribution of a(t)
given x(t) under π and (µτ)0≤τ≤t. Note that if π is a Markov policy
(i.e., πt(da(t)|g(t)) = πt(da(t)|x(t)) for all t), then Pπ(da(t)|x(t)) =
πt(da(t)|x(t)). Using Ψ and Λ, we now introduce the notion of an
equilibrium for the mean-field game.
Definition 3. A pair (π, µ) ∈ Π×M is a mean-field equilibrium if π ∈
Φ(µ) and µ = Λ(π).
The following structural result shows that the restriction to
Markov policies entails no loss of optimality.
Proposition 1. For any state measure flow µ ∈ M, we have
inf
π∈Π
Jµ(π) = inf
π∈M
Jµ(π).
Furthermore, we have Λ(Π) = Λ(M); that is, for any π ∈ Π, there
exists πˆ ∈ M such that µπt = µπˆt for all t ≥ 0.
Proof. This can be proved as in [38, Proposition 3.2]. Hence, we omit
the details.
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This result implies that we can restrict ourselves to Markov poli-
cies in the definitions of Φ and Λ without any loss of generality. Fur-
thermore, it also implies that, unlike the finite-population case, the
policy in the mean-field equilibrium constitutes a true Nash equilib-
rium of Markovian type for the infinite-population game problem.
In this section, themain goal is to establish the existence of amean-
field equilibrium. To that end, we impose the assumptions below on
the components of the mean-field game model.
Assumption 1.
(a) The cost function c is bounded and continuous with ‖c‖ ≤ K.
(b) The stochastic kernel p is weakly continuous in (x, a, µ);
i.e., p( · |x(k), a(k), µk) → p( · |x, a, µ) weakly when
(x(k), a(k), µk) → (x, a, µ).
(c) A is compact.
(d) There exist a constant α ≥ 0 and a continuous moment function
w : X→ [1,∞) (see [21, Definition E.7]) such that
sup
(a,µ)∈A×P(X)
∫
X
w(y)p(dy|x, a, µ) ≤ αw(x). (3)
(e) The initial probability measure µ0 satisfies∫
X
w(x)µ0(dx) =: M < ∞.
Remark 1. To ease the exposition of the paper, we assume that the
one-stage cost function c is bounded. However, one can extend all the
results in this paper to the case where the one-stage cost function c is
unbounded with some growth condition (see [38, Section 2.1]).
In this section, we prove the existence of a mean-field equilibrium
under Assumption 1. Later we will show that this mean-field equi-
librium constitutes an approximate Nash-equilibrium for games with
sufficiently many agents.
Theorem 1. Under Assumption 1, the mean-field game
(
X,A, p, c, µ0
)
admits a mean-field equilibrium (π, µ).
The proof of Theorem 1 is given in the next section.
4 Proof of Theorem 1
4.1 Risk-Sensitive Nonhomogeneous MDPs
Note that, given any measure flow µ ∈ M, the optimal control prob-
lem for the mean-field game reduces to one of finding an optimal
10
policy for a risk-sensitive nonhomogeneous Markov decision pro-
cess. Hence, before starting the proof of Theorem 1, we first derive
some relevant results on risk-sensitive nonhomogeneous Markov deci-
sion processeswhich aremostly absent and dispersed in the literature.
To this end, fix any µ ∈ M and consider the corresponding optimal
control problem. In the remainder of this section, when we say pol-
icy, it should be understood as Markov policy as it is sufficient for
optimality by Proposition 1.
Define
pt( · |x, a) := p( · |x, a, µt)
ct(x, a) := c(x, a, µt).
For any γ > 0, we define
Jnk (π, x, γ) := E
π
[
eγ ∑
n
t=k β
t−kct(x(t),a(t))
∣∣∣∣x(k) = x
]
Jnk (x, γ) := infπ
Jnk (π, x, γ)
Jk(π, x, γ) := E
π
[
eγ ∑
∞
t=k β
t−kct(x(t),a(t))
∣∣∣∣x(k) = x
]
Jk(x, γ) := inf
π
Jk(π, x, γ),
where n ≥ k ≥ 0. With these definitions, the cost function of any
policy πwith initial distribution µ0 = δx is J0(π, x, λ) and the optimal
value function is J0(x, λ). Furthermore, for any k ≥ 1, we have
Eπ
[
eλ ∑
∞
t=k β
tct(x(t),a(t))
∣∣∣∣x(k) = x
]
= Jk(π, x, λβ
k)
inf
π
Eπ
[
eλ ∑
∞
t=k β
tct(x(t),a(t))
∣∣∣∣x(k) = x
]
= Jk(x, λβ
k).
We first prove that finite-horizon cost functions and optimal value
functions are continuous and bounded.
Lemma 1. For each n ≥ k ≥ 0, we have Jnk (·, λβk) ∈ Cb(X) with
‖Jnk (·, λβk)‖ ≤ eλKζk,n , where K is the constant in Assumption 1-(a)
and ζk,n := ∑
n
t=k β
k which is less than 11−β .
Proof. Fix any n. Then, we prove the result by backward induction on
k. For k = n, we have
Jnn(x, λβ
n) = inf
π
Eπ
[
eλβ
ncn(x(n),a(n))
∣∣∣∣x(n) = x
]
= inf
a∈A
eλβ
ncn(x,a).
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Since A is compact and eλβ
ncn(x,a) ∈ Cb(X× A), we have Jnn(·, λβn) ∈
Cb(X) and obviously ‖Jnn (·, λβk)‖ ≤ eλKζn,n . Suppose the claim holds
for k+ 1 and consider k. We have
Jnk (x, λβ
k) = inf
π
Eπ
[
eλβ
k ∑
n
t=k β
t−kct(x(t),a(t))
∣∣∣∣x(k) = x
]
= inf
π
Eπ
[
eλβ
kck(x(k),a(k))eλβ
k ∑
n
t=k+1 β
t−kct(x(t),a(t))
∣∣∣∣x(k) = x
]
(a)
= inf
a∈A
{
eλβ
kck(x,a) inf
π
Eπ
[
eλβ
k+1 ∑
n
t=k+1 β
t−k−1ct(x(t),a(t))
∣∣∣∣x(k) = x, a(k) = a
]}
= inf
a∈A
{
eλβ
kck(x,a)
∫
X
Jnk+1(y, λβ
k+1)pk(dy|x, a)
}
,
where (a) follows from the fact that the current state and action pair
(x, a) affects the future cost only through the transition probability
pk( · |x, a) and the multiplicative constant eλβkck(x,a). Since A is com-
pact, ck ∈ Cb(X× A), Jnk+1(·, λβk+1) ∈ Cb(X), and pk is weakly contin-
uous, we have Jnk (·, λβk) ∈ Cb(X) with ‖Jnk (·, λβk)‖ ≤ eλKζk,n .
For each k ≥ 0, define the operator Tk : Cb(X)→ Cb(X) as
[Tku](x) := inf
a∈A
[
eλβ
kck(x,a)
∫
X
u(y)pk(dy|x, a)
]
. (4)
Therefore, in view of the proof of Lemma 1, for each n > k ≥ 0, we
have [
Tk J
n
k+1(·, λβk+1)
]
(x) = Jnk (x, λβ
k). (5)
A similar conclusion can be derived for n = ∞ as it is stated in the
next lemma.
Lemma 2. For each k ≥ 0, [Tk Jk+1(·, λβk+1)](x) = Jk(x, λβk).
The next lemma states that the finite-horizon optimal cost function
converges uniformly to the infinite-horizon optimal cost function. To
prove the result, we use the following inequality for y1 > 0, y2 > 0:
eλ(y1+y2) ≤ eλy1 + λeλ(y1+y2)y2. (6)
This inequality is a special case of the inequality U(y1 + y2) ≤
U(y1) +U
′
(y1 + y2)y2 for U : R+ → R convex (see [4]).
Lemma 3. For each k ≥ 0, we have∥∥Jnk (·, λβk)− Jk(·, λβk)∥∥ ≤ Lkβn+1 → 0 as n→ ∞,
where Lk :=
λK
1−β e
λβkK
1−β . Therefore, for each k ≥ 0, Jk(·, λβk) ∈ Cb(X)
with ‖Jk(·, λβk)‖ ≤ eλ
K
1−β .
Proof. Note that Jnk (·, λβk) ≤ Jn+1k (·, λβk) ≤ Jk(·, λβk) for all n as ct ≥
0 for all t ≥ 0. Moreover, for any policy π, we have
Jk(π, x, λβ
k) = Eπ
[
eλβ
k ∑
∞
t=k β
t−kct(x(t),a(t))
∣∣∣∣x(k) = x
]
= Eπ
[
eλβ
k
(
∑
n
t=k β
t−kct(x(t),a(t))+∑∞t=n+1 βt−kct(x(t),a(t))
)∣∣∣∣x(k) = x
]
≤ Eπ
[
eλβ
k ∑
n
t=k β
t−kct(x(t),a(t))+ λβkeλβ
k ∑
∞
t=k β
t−kct(x(t),a(t))
∞
∑
t=n+1
βt−kct(x(t), a(t))
∣∣∣∣x(k) = x
]
(by (6))
≤ Jnk (π, x, λβk) +
λK
1− β e
λβkK
1−β βn+1
=: Jnk (π, x, λβ
k) + Lkβ
n+1.
Therefore, we have∥∥Jnk (·, λβk)− Jk(·, λβk)∥∥ ≤ Lkβn+1 → 0 as n→ ∞.
The following is a key result that characterizes the optimal poli-
cies. We use this to establish the existence of mean-field equilibrium.
Theorem 2. A policy π is optimal if and only if, for all k,
νπk
({
(x, a) : eλβ
kck(x,a)
∫
X
Jk+1(y, λβ
k+1)pk(dy|x, a)
=
[
Tk Jk+1(·, λβk+1)
]
(x)
})
= 1
(7)
where νπk = L(x(k), a(k)) under π and µ0.
Proof. Suppose first that π is optimal. Then, one can prove that
Jk(·, λβk) = Jk(π, ·, λβk), Pπ-a.s., (8)
for all k ≥ 0. Moreover, we have
Eπ
[
Jk(π, x(k), λβ
k)
]
=
∫
X×A
eλβ
kck(x,a)
∫
X
Jk+1(π, y, λβ
k+1)pk(dy|x, a)νπk (dx, da)
= Eπ
[
Jk(x(k), λβ
k)
]
(by (8))
=
∫
X×A
[
Tk Jk+1(·, λβk+1)
]
(x)νπk (dx, da).
Since eλβ
kck(x,a)
∫
X
Jk+1(π, y, λβ
k+1)pk(dy|x, a) ≥[
Tk Jk+1(·, λβk+1)
]
(x) for all (x, a) ∈ X× A, (7) holds.
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Conversely, suppose that π = {π0,π1, . . .} is a policy that satis-
fies (7). For any k ≥ 1, let πk = {πk,πk+1, . . .}. First, we prove by
induction on n that for each k = 0, 1, 2, . . .
Jn+kk (π
k, x, λβk) ≤ Jk(x, λβk), Pπ-a.s. (9)
For n = 0, we have that Jkk(π
k, x, λβk) =
∫
A
eλβ
kck(x,a)πk(da|x). On the
other hand, we have
Jk(x, λβ
k) = inf
a∈A
[
eλβ
kck(x,a)
∫
X
Jk+1(y, λβ
k+1)pk(dy|x, a)
]
=
∫
A
eλβ
kck(x,a)
∫
X
Jk+1(y, λβ
k+1)pk(dy|x, a)πk(da|x), Pπ-a.s.
≥ Jkk (πk, x, λβk) ( as Jk+1(y, λβk+1) ≥ 1).
Hence the claim holds for n = 0. Suppose that the claim holds for
n− 1 ≥ 0; that is, for each k ≥ 0, we have
J
(n−1)+k
k (π
k, x, λβk) ≤ Jk(x, λβk), Pπ-a.s.
Then, for each k ≥ 0, we have
Jn+kk (π
k, x, λβk) =
∫
A
eλβ
kck(x,a)
∫
X
Jn+kk+1 (π
k+1, y, λβk+1)pk(dy|x, a)πk(da|x)
≤
∫
A
eλβ
kck(x,a)
∫
X
Jk+1(π
k+1, y, λβk+1)pk(dy|x, a)πk(da|x), Pπ-a.s. (by induction hypothesis)
= inf
a∈A
[
eλβ
kck(x,a)
∫
X
Jk+1(π
k+1, y, λβk+1)pk(dy|x, a)
]
, Pπ-a.s.
=: Jk(x, λβ
k).
Hence, this completes the proof of (9). Note that if k = 0, thenwe have
Jn0 (π, x, λ) ≤ J0(x, λ) µ0-a.s. for all n. But, by Lemma 3, Jn0 (π, x, λ)→
J0(π, x, λ) uniformly as n → ∞. Thus, J0(π, x, λ) ≤ J0(x, λ) µ0-a.s.,
and so, π is optimal.
4.2 Proof of Existence of Mean-Field Equilibrium
We are now ready to prove Theorem 1. For each t ≥ 0, define the
following sets
P tw(X) := {µ ∈ P(X) : µ(w) ≤ αtM}
P tw(X× A) := {ν ∈ P(X× A) : ν1 ∈ P tw(X)},
where for any ν ∈ P(X× A), ν1 denotes the marginal of ν on X. Let
Ξ := ∏∞t=0 P tw(X× A), which is equipped with the infinite product
topology generated by weak convergence.
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For any ν ∈ Ξ and t ≥ 0, we define the operator Tνt : Cb(X) →
Cb(X) as
[Tνt u](x) = inf
a∈A
[
eλβ
tc(x,a,νt,1)
∫
X
u(y)p(dy|x, a, νt,1)
]
.
We let Jν∗,t(·, λβt) : X → R denote the risk-sensitive optimal value
function at time t of the nonhomogeneous Markov decision process
with the one-stage cost functions
{
c(x, a, νt,1)
}
t≥0 and the transition
probabilities
{
p( · |x, a, νt,1)
}
t≥0. By Lemma 3, for all t ≥ 0, Jν∗,t(·, λβt)
is continuous and bounded.
To prove the existence of a mean-field equilibrium, we use the
technique in our previous paper [38] adopted from [27], which en-
ables us to transform the fixed point equation π ∈ Ψ(Λ(π)) character-
izing the mean-field equilibrium into a fixed point equation of a set-
valuedmapping from the set of state-actionmeasure flows P(Z×A)∞
into itself. Then, using Kakutani’s fixed point theorem ( [2, Corollary
17.55]), we deduce the existence of a mean-field equilibrium. We note
that the technique used here to prove the existence of a mean-field
equilibrium is similar to the one in our previous paper [38], in which
we have studied a risk-neutral version of the same problem. How-
ever, there is a crucial difference in the details of the proofs between
this problem and the risk-neutral one. In the risk-neutral case, the
cost function is in an additive form, and this results in a contractive
dynamic programming operator. However, in the risk-sensitive case,
the cost function is in a multiplicative form, and therefore, the dy-
namic programming operator Tt is not contractive, which complicates
the analysis.
As we mentioned above, we first transform the fixed point equa-
tion π ∈ Ψ(Λ(π)) into a fixed point equation of a set-valuedmapping
from P(X× A)∞ into itself. To that end, define the set-valued map-
ping Γ : Ξ → 2P(X×A)∞ as follows:
Γ(ν) = C(ν) ∩ B(ν),
where
C(ν) :=
{
ν′ ∈ P(X× A)∞ : ν′0,1 = µ0 and
ν′t+1,1( · ) =
∫
X×A
p( · |x, a, νt,1)νt(dx, da)
}
and
B(ν) :=
{
ν′ ∈ P(X× A)∞ : ∀t ≥ 0, ν′t
({
(x, a) : eλβ
tc(x,a,νt,1)
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∫
X
Jν∗,t+1(y, λβ
t+1)p(dy|x, a, νt,1) = Tνt Jν∗,t+1(x, λβt+1)
})
= 1
}
.
Note that the set C(ν) characterizes the consistency of the mean-field
term with the distribution of a generic agent, and the set B(ν) char-
acterizes optimality of the policy that is obtained by disintegrating
the state-action measure-flow, for the mean-field term. The following
proposition implies that the image of Ξ under Γ is contained in 2Ξ.
Proposition 2. ( [38, Proposition 3.7]) For any ν ∈ Ξ, we have Γ(ν) ⊂ Ξ.
We say that ν ∈ Ξ is a fixed point of Γ if ν ∈ Γ(ν). The following
proposition makes the connection between mean-field equilibria and
the fixed points of Γ.
Proposition 3. Suppose that Γ has a fixed point ν = (νt)t≥0. Construct
a Markov policy π = (πt)t≥0 by disintegrating each νt as νt(dx, da) =
νt,1(dx)πt(da|x), and let ν1 = (νt,1)t≥0. Then the pair (π, ν1) is a
mean-field equilibrium.
Proof. If ν ∈ Γ(ν), then the corresponding Markov policy π satisfies
(7) for ν. Therefore, by Theorem 2, π ∈ Φ(ν1). Moreover, since ν ∈
C(ν), we have Λ(π) = ν1. This completes the proof.
By Proposition 3, it suffices to prove that Γ has a fixed point in order
to establish the existence of a mean-field equilibrium. To prove this,
we use Kakutani’s fixed point theorem ( [2, Corollary 17.55]). Note
that, since w is a continuous moment function, the set P tw(X) is com-
pact with respect to the weak topology ( [21, Proposition E.8, p. 187]),
and so, P tw(X×A) is tight as A is compact. Furthermore, P tw(X×A) is
closed with respect to the weak topology. Hence, P tw(X× A) is com-
pact with respect to the weak topology. Therefore, Ξ is compact with
respect to the product topology. In addition, Ξ is also convex. Fur-
thermore, it can be proved that C(ν) ∩ B(ν) 6= ∅ for any ν ∈ Ξ. We
can also show that both C(ν) and B(ν) are convex, and thus their in-
tersection is also convex. Moreover, Ξ is a convex compact subset of
a locally convex topological spaceM(X× A)∞, whereM(X× A) de-
notes the set of finite signed measures on X× A. The final result we
need to prove in order to deduce the existence of a fixed point of Γ by
an appeal to Kakutani’s fixed point theorem is the following:
Proposition 4. The graph of Γ, i.e., the set
Gr(Γ) := {(ν, ξ) ∈ Ξ× Ξ : ξ ∈ Γ(ν)} ,
is closed.
Proof. Let
{
(ν(n), ξ(n))
}
n≥1 ⊂ Ξ × Ξ be such that ξ(n) ∈ Γ(ν(n)) for
all n and (ν(n), ξ(n)) → (ν, ξ) as n → ∞ for some (ν, ξ) ∈ Ξ × Ξ. To
prove Gr(Γ) is closed, it is sufficient to prove ξ ∈ Γ(ν).
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One can prove that ξ ∈ C(ν) (see the proof of [38, Proposition
3.9]). Hence, it remains to prove that ξ ∈ B(ν). For each n and t, let
us define
F
(n)
t (x, a) = e
λβtc(x,a,ν
(n)
t,1 )
∫
X
Jν
(n)
∗,t+1(y, λβ
t+1)p(dy|x, a, ν(n)t,1 )
and
Ft(x, a) = e
λβtc(x,a,νt,1)
∫
X
Jν∗,t+1(y, λβ
t+1)p(dy|x, a, νt,1).
By definition,
Jν
(n)
∗,t (x, λβt) = inf
a∈A
F
(n)
t (x, a) and J
ν∗,t(x, λβt) = inf
a∈A
Ft(x, a).
By assumption, we have
1 = ξ
(n)
t
({
(x, a) : F
(n)
t (x, a) = J
ν(n)∗,t (x, λβt)
})
, for all n.
Let A
(n)
t :=
{
(x, a) : F
(n)
t (x, a) = J
ν(n)∗,t (x, λβt)
}
. Since both F
(n)
t and
Jν
(n)
∗,t are continuous, A
(n)
t is closed. Define At :=
{
(x, a) : Ft(x, a) =
Jν∗,t(x, λβt)
}
which is also closed as both Ft and J
ν∗,t are continuous.
Suppose that F
(n)
t converges to Ft continuously and J
ν(n)∗,t converges
to Jν∗,t continuously, as n→ ∞1 (see [39, p. 388]).
For each M ≥ 1, define BMt :=
{
(x, a) : Ft(x, a) ≥ Jν∗,t(x, λβt) +
ǫ(M)
}
which is closed, where ǫ(M)→ 0 asM→ ∞. Since both Ft and
Jν∗,t are continuous, we can choose {ǫ(M)}M≥1 so that ξt(∂BMt ) = 0
for each M. Since Act =
⋃∞
M=1 B
M
t and B
M
t ⊂ BM+1t , we have by the
monotone convergence theorem
ξ
(n)
t
(
Act ∩ A(n)t
)
= lim inf
M→∞
ξ
(n)
t
(
BMt ∩ A(n)t ).
Hence, we have
1 = lim sup
n→∞
lim inf
M→∞
{
ξ
(n)
t
(
At ∩ A(n)t
)
+ ξ
(n)
t
(
BMt ∩ A(n)t
)}
≤ lim inf
M→∞
lim sup
n→∞
{
ξ
(n)
t
(
At ∩ A(n)t
)
+ ξ
(n)
t
(
BMt ∩ A(n)t
)}
.
For fixed M, we prove that the second term in the last expression con-
verges to zero as n → ∞. First, note that ξ(n)t converges weakly to ξt
1Suppose g, gn (n ≥ 1) are measurable functions on metric space E. The sequence gn is
said to converge to g continuously if limn→∞ gn(en) = g(e) for any en → e where e ∈ E.
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as n → ∞ when both measures are restricted to BMt , as BMt is closed
and ξt(∂BMt ) = 0 [8, Theorem 8.2.3]. Furthermore, 1A(n)t ∩BMt
converges
continuously to 0: if (x(n), a(n)) → (x, a) in BMt , then
lim
n→∞ F
(n)
t (x
(n), a(n)) = Ft(x, a)
≥ J∗,t(x, λβt) + ǫ(M)
= lim
n→∞ J
(n)
∗,t (x
(n), λβt) + ǫ(M).
Hence, for large enough n, we have F
(n)
t (x
(n), a(n)) > J
(n)
∗,t (x(n), λβt),
which implies that (x(n), a(n)) 6∈ A(n)t . Then, by [28, Theorem 3.5], for
each M we have
lim sup
n→∞
ξ
(n)
t
(
BMt ∩ A(n)t
)
= 0.
Therefore, we obtain
1 ≤ lim sup
n→∞
ξ
(n)
t
(
At ∩ A(n)t
)
≤ lim sup
n→∞
ξ
(n)
t (At)
≤ ξt(At),
where the last inequality follows from the portmanteau theorem [6,
Theorem 2.1] and the fact that At is closed. Hence, ξt(At) = 1. Since t
is arbitrary, this is true for all t. This means that ξ ∈ B(ν). Therefore,
ξ ∈ Γ(ν) which completes the proof under the assumption that F(n)t
converges to Ft continuously and J
ν(n)∗,t converges to Jν∗,t continuously,
as n→ ∞, which we prove next.
Note that, for continuous functions, continuous convergence coin-
cides with uniform convergence over compact sets (see [28, Lemma
2.1]). Therefore, it suffices to establish that F
(n)
t uniformly converges
to Ft over compact sets and J
ν(n)∗,t uniformly converges to Jν∗,t over
compact sets, as these functions are all continuous. Furthermore, if
Jν
(n)
∗,t converges to Jν∗,t continuously for all t, then F
(n)
t also converges
to Ft continuously for all t. Indeed, let (x(n), a(n)) → (x, a). Since
Jν
(n)
∗,t+1(y, λβ
t+1) ≤ eλ K1−β for all n ≥ 1, by [28, Theorem 3.5] we have
lim
n→∞ F
(n)
t (x
(n), a(n)) = lim
n→∞
[
eλβ
tc(x(n),a(n),ν
(n)
t,1 )
∫
X
Jν
(n)
∗,t+1(y, λβ
t+1)p(dy|x(n), a(n), ν(n)t,1 )
]
= eλβ
tc(x,a,νt,1)
∫
X
Jν∗,t+1(y, λβ
t+1)p(dy|x, a, νt,1)
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= Ft(x, a).
Therefore, it is sufficient to prove that Jν
(n)
∗,t uniformly converges to Jν∗,t
over compact sets, for all t.
Proposition 5. For any compact K ⊂ X, we have
lim
n→∞ supx∈K
∣∣Jν(n)∗,t (x, λβt)− Jν∗,t(x, λβt)| = 0
for all t ≥ 0. Therefore, Jν(n)∗,t converges to Jν∗,t continuously as n→ ∞,
for all t.
Proof. For each k ≥ t ≥ 0, ν ∈ Ξ, we let Jν∗,t(x, λβt, k) denote the
optimal value function at time t of the risk-sensitive nonhomogeneous
MDP with finite horizon k corresponding to ν. By Lemma 3, we have
‖Jν∗,t(·, λβt, k)− Jν∗,t(·, λβt)‖ ≤ Ltβk+1. (10)
We first prove the following result for finite horizon optimal value
functions.
Lemma 4. For all t ≥ 0 and for any compact K ⊂ X, we have
lim
n→∞ supx∈K
∣∣Jν(n)∗,t (x, λβt,m+ t)− Jν∗,t(x, λβt,m+ t)∣∣ = 0 for any m ≥ 0.
Proof. We prove the result by induction on m. For m = 0, we have
sup
x∈K
∣∣Jν(n)∗,t (x, λβt, t)− Jν∗,t(x, λβt, t)∣∣ = sup
x∈K
∣∣∣∣ inf
a∈A
eλβ
tc(x,a,ν
(n)
t,1 ) − inf
a∈A
eλβ
tc(x,a,νt,1)
∣∣∣∣
≤ sup
(x,a)∈K×A
∣∣∣∣eλβtc(x,a,ν(n)t,1 ) − eλβtc(x,a,νt,1)
∣∣∣∣.
Since eλβ
tc(·,·,ν(n)t,1 ) converges to eλβtc(·,·,νt,1) continuously and since
eλβ
tc(·,·,νt,1) is continuous, the last term converges to 0 as continuous
convergence and uniform convergence on compact sets are equiva-
lent in this case. Hence, the claim holds for m = 0.
Suppose the claim holds for a general m. Then consider m+ 1. We
have
sup
x∈K
∣∣Jν(n)∗,t (x, λβt,m+ 1+ t)− Jν∗,t(x, λβt,m+ 1+ t)∣∣
= sup
x∈K
∣∣∣∣ inf
a∈A
[
eλβ
tc(x,a,ν
(n)
t,1 )
∫
X
Jν
(n)
∗,t+1(y, λβ
t+1,m+ 1+ t)p(dy|x, a, ν(n)t,1 )
]
− inf
a∈A
[
eλβ
tc(x,a,νt,1)
∫
X
Jν∗,t+1(y, λβ
t+1,m+ 1+ t)p(dy|x, a, νt,1)
]∣∣∣∣
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≤ sup
(x,a)∈K×A
∣∣∣∣eλβtc(x,a,ν(n)t,1 )
∫
X
Jν
(n)
∗,t+1(y, λβ
t+1,m+ 1+ t)p(dy|x, a, ν(n)t,1 )
− eλβtc(x,a,νt,1)
∫
X
Jν∗,t+1(y, λβ
t+1,m+ 1+ t)p(dy|x, a, νt,1)
∣∣∣∣.
Note that by induction hypothesis and by Lemma 1,
Jν
(n)
∗,t+1(·, λβt+1,m + (t + 1)) converges to Jν∗,t+1(·, λβt+1,m + (t + 1))
continuously. Then, by [28, Theorem 3.5], the last term converges to
zero as continuous convergence is equivalent to uniform convergence
on compact sets for continuous functions.
Using the above lemma, we now complete the proof of Proposi-
tion 5. Fix any compact K ⊂ X. For all m ≥ 0, we have
sup
x∈K
∣∣Jν(n)∗,t (x, λβt)− Jν∗,t(x, λβt)|
≤ ‖Jν(n)∗,t (·, λβt)− Jν
(n)
∗,t (·, λβt,m+ t)‖
+ sup
x∈K
∣∣Jν(n)∗,t (·, λβt,m+ t)− Jν∗,t(·, λβt,m+ t)∣∣
+ ‖Jν∗,t(·, λβt)− Jν∗,t(·, λβt,m+ t)‖
≤ 2Ltβm+t+1 + sup
x∈K
∣∣Jν(n)∗,t (·, λβt,m+ t)− Jν∗,t(·, λβt,m+ t)∣∣
This last expression can be made arbitrarily small by first choosing
large enough m and then large enough n.
Recall that Ξ is a compact convex subset of the locally convex topo-
logical spaceM(X×A)∞. Furthermore, Γ has closed graph by Propo-
sition 4, and it takes nonempty convex values. Therefore, by Kaku-
tani’s fixed point theorem [2, Corollary 17.55], Γ has a fixed point.
Then, Theorem 1 follows from Proposition 3.
Remark 2. Note that, given any state measure flow µ ∈ M, it is
possible to formulate the corresponding risk-sensitive optimal con-
trol problem, defined in Section 4.1, as a zero-sum dynamic game
with risk-neutral cost function using the following duality relation
between logarithmic moment generating function and relative en-
tropy [26]:
log
(∫
X
eg(x)ζ(dx)
)
= sup
ν∈P(X)
[∫
X
g(x)ν(dx)− h(ν‖ζ)
]
, (11)
where g : X → R is bounded and measurable and h(ν‖ζ) denotes
the relative entropy of ν with respect to ζ [36]. Indeed, one can
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prove along the lines of [20, 26] that the risk-sensitive optimal con-
trol problem is equivalent to the following risk-neutral zero-sum dy-
namic game. In this game model, the state space is X, the action space
for Player 1 (minimizer) is A, and the action space for Player 2 (max-
imizer) is P(X). For any (x, a, q) ∈ X× A× P(X), the one-stage cost
(reward for Player 2) function at time t is
dt(x, a, q) := λβ
tct(x, a)− h(q‖pt( · |x, a)).
The evolution of the system is as follows. At a state xt (t ≥ 0), Player 1
chooses its action at from A (possibly randomized) based on the cur-
rent time t and the current state xt and Player 2 chooses its action from
P(X) based on the current time t and the current state-action pair
(xt, at). Let π = {πt} denote the policy for Player 1 and let η = {ηt}
denote the policy for Player 2. Hence, at each time t, πt(da|x) is a
stochastic kernel on A given X and ηt(dy|x, a) is a stochastic kernel on
X given X × A. Then, the system moves to the next state according
to the probability distribution ηt(dy|x, a); that is, the state transition
probability of the game model is given by r(dy|x, a, q) := δq(dy).
For any policy pair (π, η) and initial state x, the risk-neutral cost
of the game is given by
W0(x,π, η) := E
π,η
[ ∞
∑
t=0
dt(xt, at, qt)
]
= Eπ,η
[ ∞
∑
t=0
λβtct(xt, at)− h(qt( · |xt, at)‖pt( · |xt, at))
]
.
Then, the optimal upper-value function is defined as
W0(x) := inf
π
sup
η
W0(x,π, η).
For k ≥ 1, let Wk denote the optimal upper-value function of the
game at time k. Then, these functions satisfy the following sequence
of Isaacs equations (see [20, Lemma 3.5] and [26, Lemma 1]):
Wk(x) = inf
a∈A
sup
q∈P(X)
[∫
X
Wk+1(y)q(dy) + λβ
kck(x, a)− h(q‖pk( · |x, a))
]
.
(12)
Note that, by first using duality formula (11) and then taking the ex-
ponentials of both sides, we can write (12) as
eWk(x) = inf
a∈X
[
eλβ
kck(x,a)
∫
X
eWk+1(y)pk(dy|x, a)
]
,
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which is exactly the dynamic programming recursion for the risk-
sensitive optimal control problem with eWk(x) = Jk(x, λβ
k) in
Lemma 2. Then, by using similar arguments as in [26, Proposition
1 and Lemma 1], it is possible to deduce that this risk-neutral game
model is equivalent to the risk-sensitive optimal control problem in
Section 4.1.
Equivalency of the two problems suggests that the existence of
mean-field equilibrium can be established by analyzing the equiva-
lent zero-sum dynamic game with risk-neutral cost function. To do
this, one has to identify the relation between the state-measure flows
in zero-sum dynamic game and the state-measure flows in the con-
trol problem along with the fact that a state-measure flow in any
mean-field equilibrium for risk-neutral zero-sum game corresponds
to a state-measure flow in some mean-field equilibrium for the risk-
sensitive control problem and vice versa. This is an interesting future
research direction.
We note that the same equivalency result may not hold for the
finite-population case; that is, one cannot write the problem of a
generic agent in the finite-population regime as a zero-sum dynamic
game with risk-neutral cost function. One of the reasons for this is
that, in the finite-population case, there is no dynamic programming
recursion for the optimal value functions because of the coupling be-
tween agents and the information structure. However, it is still an in-
teresting research direction to study the finite-population mean-field
game in which a generic agent is faced with zero-sum dynamic game
of the form described above.
5 Existence of Approximate Markov-Nash
Equilibria
In this section, we prove that the policy generated by the mean-field
equilibrium, when adopted by each agent, is approximate Markov-
Nash equilibrium for games with a sufficiently large number of
agents. Let (π, µ) denote the pair in themean-field equilibrium. In ad-
dition to Assumption 1, we impose an additional assumption, which
is stated below. To this end, let dBL denote the bounded Lipschitz met-
ric (see, e.g., [16, Proposition 11.3.2]) on P(X) that metrizes the weak
topology, and define the following moduli of continuity:
ωp(r) := sup
(x,a)∈X×A
sup
µ,ν:
dBL(µ,ν)≤r
‖p( · |x, a, µ)− p( · |x, a, ν)‖TV
ωc(r) := sup
(x,a)∈X×A
sup
µ,ν:
dBL(µ,ν)≤r
|c(x, a, µ)− c(x, a, ν)|.
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Assumption 2.
(a) ωp(r)→ 0 and ωc(r) → 0 as r → 0.
(b) For each t ≥ 0, πt : X→ P(A) is weakly continuous.
Remark 3. Note that, if the state transition probability p is independent
of the mean-field term, then Assumption 2-(a) for p is always true.
Remark 4. To ensure Assumption 2-(b), we can impose the following
uniqueness condition, which is common in the mean-field literature
(see, e.g., [18, Assuption 4], [14, Assumption A5], [25, Assumption
H5], [13, Assumption A9]): Suppose that, for each µ, there exists a
unique minimizer ax ∈ A of
eλβ
tc(x, · ,µt)
∫
X
J
µ
∗,t+1(x
′)p(dx′|x, · , µt) =: Ht(x, · ), (13)
for each x ∈ X and for all t ≥ 0. Under this condition, one can
prove that the policy π in mean-field equilibrium is deterministic and
weakly continuous. To prove this, fix any t ≥ 0 and consider the pol-
icy πt at time t in π. By (13), we must have πt( · |x) = δ ft(x)( · ) for
some ft : X → A that minimizes Ht(x, · ) of the above form. We now
prove that ft is continuous, which implies weak continuity. Suppose
xn → x in X. Note that gt( · ) = mina∈A Ht( · , a) is continuous since
A is compact and Ht is continuous. Therefore, every accumulation
point of the sequence { ft(xn)}n≥1 must be a minimizer for Ht(x, · ).
Since there exists a unique minimizer ft(x) of Ht(x, · ), the set of all
accumulation points of { ft(xn)}n≥1 must be singleton { ft(x)}. This
implies that ft(xn) converges to ft(x) since A is compact. Hence, ft is
continuous. Thus, Assumption 2-(b).
One can establish the existence of a unique minimizer to (13) un-
der the following conditions on the system components. Suppose
that X = Rd and A ⊂ Rm is convex. In addition, suppose that
p(dx′|x, a, µ) = ̺(x′|x, a, µ)m(dx′), where m denotes the Lebesgue
measure. Assume that both ̺ and c are convex in a. Hence, for any
a ∈ A, (13) can be written as
eλβ
tc(x, · ,µt)
∫
X
J
µ
∗,t+1(x
′)̺(x′|x, · , µt)m(dx′).
Since c and ̺ are convex in a, the last expression above is strictly con-
vex in a as exponential function is strictly convex. Hence, there exists
a unique minimizer ax ∈ A for (13).
The following theorem is the main result of this section:
Theorem 3. For any ε > 0, there exists N(ε) such that for N ≥ N(ε),
the policy pi(N) = (π, . . . ,π) is an ε-Markov-Nash equilibrium for the
game with N agents.
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Proof of Theorem 3
To prove Theorem 3, we first consider the game problem with a
finite-horizon discounted risk-sensitive cost function. For any finite-
horizon n, we prove the following result.
Theorem 4. For each N, let π˜(N) be some arbitrary weakly continuous
Markov policy for Agent 1. Then, the following are true:
lim
N→∞
J
(N),n
1 (π, . . . ,π) = J
n
µ (π), (14)
lim
N→∞
∣∣J(N),n1 (π˜(N),π, . . . ,π)− Jnµ(π˜(N))∣∣ = 0. (15)
In Theorem 4, superscript n denotes the finite-horizon; that is, for
instance, we have
J
(N),n
1 (π, . . . ,π) := E
pi(N)
[
eλ ∑
n
t=0 β
tc(xN1 (t),a
N
1 (t),e
(N)
t )
]
.
Note that, in risk-sensitive cost, the one-stage cost functions are in
a multiplicative form as opposed to risk-neutral case, and this makes
the analysis of the approximation problem quite complicated. There-
fore, to prove Theorem 4, we will first construct an equivalent game
model whose states are the state of the original model plus the one-
stage costs incurred up to that time. For instance, for the infinite-
population limit, the new state is
s(t) :=
(
x(t),
t−1
∑
k=0
c(x(k), a(k), µk)
)
.
In this new model, finite-horizon risk-sensitive cost function can be
written in an additive-form like in risk-neutral case. Therefore, we
can use the proof technique in our previous paper [38] to show the
existence of an approximate Nash equilibrium. It is important to note
that for this new game model, we have been inspired by [4], in which
the authors study the classical risk-sensitive control problem. This
new game model is specified by(
S,A, {Pt}t≥0, {Ct}t≥0, κ0
)
,
where
S = X× [0, L]
with L := K1−β and A are the Polish state and action spaces, respec-
tively. The stochastic kernel Pt : S × A × P(S) → P(S) is defined
as:
Pt
(
B× D∣∣s(t), a(t),∆t) := p(B|x(t), a(t),∆t,1)⊗ δc(t)+βtc(x(t),a(t),∆t,1)(D),
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where B ∈ B(X), D ∈ B([0, L]),
s(t) = (x(t), c(t)),
and ∆t,1 is the marginal of ∆t on X. Here, Pt is indeed the con-
trolled transition probability of next state x(t + 1) and current to-
tal cost ∑tk=0 β
kc(x(k), a(k),∆k,1) given the current state-action pair
(x(t), a(t)) and past total cost ∑t−1k=0 β
kc(x(k), a(k),∆k,1) in the orig-
inal mean-field game. For each t ≥ 0, the one-stage cost function
Ct : S× A×P(S) → [0,∞) is defined as:
Ct(s(t), a(t),∆t) :=
{
0, if t ≤ n
eλc(t), if t = n+ 1.
Finally, the initial measure κ0 is given by κ0(ds(0)) := µ0(dx(0))⊗
δ0(dc(0)). Note that, in this equivalent gamemodel, the finite-horizon
is n+ 1 instead of n.
Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then, for each t ≥ 0, the
following are satisfied:
(I) The one-stage cost function Ct is bounded and continuous.
(II) The stochastic kernel Pt is weakly continuous.
It is straightforward to prove that (I) and (II) hold since c is continuous
and p is weakly continuous.
Recall the set of Markov policies M in the original mean-field
game. Note that M is a subset of the set of Markov policies in the
new model. For any measure flow ∆ = (∆t)t≥0, where ∆t ∈ P(S),
we denote by Jˆn
∆
(π) the finite-horizon risk-sensitive cost of the policy
π ∈ M in this new model.
We also define the corresponding N agent game as follows. We
have the Polish state space S and action space A. For every t ∈
{0, 1, 2, . . .} and every i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,N}, let sNi (t) = (xNi (t), cNi (t)) ∈ S
and aNi (t) ∈ A denote the state and the action of Agent i at time t, and
let
∆
(N)
t ( · ) :=
1
N
N
∑
i=1
δsNi (t)
( · ) ∈ P(S)
denote the empirical distribution of the state configuration at time t.
The initial states sNi (0) are independent and identically distributed
according to κ0, and, for each t ≥ 0, the next-state configuration
(sN1 (t + 1), . . . , s
N
N(t + 1)) is generated at random according to the
probability laws
N
∏
i=1
Pt
(
dsNi (t+ 1)
∣∣sNi (t), aNi (t),∆(N)t ).
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Recall that Mi denotes the set of Markov policies for Agent i in
the original game. Note that Mi is a subset of the Markov policies of
the new model. Recall that Mci denotes the set of all weakly contin-
uous Markov policies for Agent i in the original game. For Agent i,
the finite-horizon risk-sensitive cost under the initial distribution κ0
and N-tuple of policies pi(N) ∈ M(N) is denoted as Jˆ(N),ni (pi(N)). The
following proposition makes the connection between this new model
and the original model.
Proposition 6. For any N ≥ 1, pi(N) ∈ M(N), and i = 1, . . . ,N, we have
Jˆ
(N),n
i (pi
(N)) = J
(N),n
i (pi
(N)). Similarly, for any π ∈ M and measure
flow ∆, we have Jˆn
∆
(π) = Jnµ(π) where µ = (∆t,1)t≥0.
Proof. The proof of the proposition is given in Appendix A.
By Proposition 6, in the remainder of this section we consider the
new game model in place of the original one. Then, we use a similar
technique as in our previous paper [38] to prove Theorem 4.
Define the measure flow ∆ = (∆t)t≥0 as follows: ∆t =
L(x(t),∑t−1k=0 c(x(k), a(k), µk)), where L(x(t),∑t−1k=0 c(x(k), a(k), µk))
denotes the probability law of (x(t),∑t−1k=0 c(x(k), a(k), µk)) in the orig-
inal mean-field game under the policy π and measure flow µ in the
mean-field equilibrium. Note that, for each t, ∆t,1 = µt. Define the
stochastic kernel Pπt ( · |s,∆) on S given S×P(S) as
Pπt ( · |s,∆) :=
∫
A
Pt( · |s, a,∆)πt(da|s).
Since πt is assumed to be weakly continuous, P
π
t ( · |s,∆) is also
weakly continuous in (s,∆). In the sequel, to ease the notation, we
will also write Pπt ( · |s,∆) as Pπt,∆( · |s). Note that ∆0 = κ0.
Lemma 5. Measure flow ∆ satisfies
∆t+1( · ) =
∫
S
Pπt ( · |s,∆t)∆t(ds)
= ∆tP
π
t,∆t
( · ).
Proof. For any t, we have
∆t+1(·) =
∫
X×A
p(·|x, a, µt)⊗ δc+βtc(x,a,µt)(·)πt(da|x)∆t(dx, dc)
=
∫
S×A
Pt(·|s, a,∆t)πt(da|x)∆t(ds) (as ∆t,1 = µt)
= ∆tP
π
t,∆t
( · ),
where s = (x, c). This completes the proof.
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For each N ≥ 1, let {sNi (t)}1≤i≤N denote the state configuration at
time t in the N-person game under the policy pi(N) = {π,π, . . . ,π}.
Define the empirical distribution
∆
(N)
t ( · ) :=
1
N
N
∑
i=1
δsNi (t)
( · ).
Proposition 7. For all t ≥ 0, we have
L(∆(N)t ) → δ∆t
weakly in P(P(S)), as N → ∞.
Proof. The proof of the proposition is given in Appendix B.
Proposition 7 states that, in the infinite-population limit, the em-
pirical distribution of the states under themean-field policy converges
to the deterministic measure flow ∆. Since Pt( · |s, a,∆) is continuous
in ∆ for each t, the evolution of the state of a generic agent in the
finite-agent game with sufficiently many agents and the evolution of
the state in the mean-field game under policies pi(N) = (π, . . . ,π) and
π, respectively, should therefore be close. Hence, the distributions of
the states in each problem should also be close, fromwhich we obtain
the first part of Theorem 4 in view of Proposition 6.
Proposition 8. We have
lim
N→∞
Jˆ
(N),n
1 (pi
(N)) = Jˆn
∆
(π),
where pi(N) = (π, . . . ,π).
Proof. Recall that Ct = 0 for t ≤ n. Hence, we let t = n+ 1. Since for
any fixed permutation σ of {1, . . . ,N}, we have
L(sN1 (t), . . . , sNN(t),∆(N)t ) = L(sNσ(1)(t), . . . , sNσ(N)(t),∆(N)t ),
the cost function at time t = n+ 1 can be written as
E
[
Ct(s
N
1 (t))
]
=
1
N
N
∑
i=1
E
[
Ct(s
N
i (t))
]
= E
[
∆
(N)
t
(
Ct(s)
)]
.
Let F : P(S) → R be defined as
F(∆) :=
∫
S
Ct(s)∆(ds).
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Note that F ∈ Cb(P(S)) as Ct ∈ Cb(S). Hence, by Proposition 7, we
obtain
lim
N→∞
E
[
Ct(s
N
1 (t))
]
= lim
N→∞
E
[
∆
(N)
t
(
Ct(s)
)]
= lim
N→∞
E[F(∆
(N)
t )]
= F(∆t)
= ∆t(Ct). (16)
Note that by Lemma 5, the discounted cost in the mean-field game
can be written as
Jˆn
∆
(π) = ∆t(Ct).
Therefore, by (16), we obtain
lim
N→∞
Jˆ
(N),n
1 (pi
(N)) = Jˆn
∆
(π),
which completes the proof.
Recall the policies {π˜(N)}N≥1 ⊂ Mc1 in Theorem 4. For each N ≥
1, let
{
s˜Ni (t)
}
1≤i≤N be the collection of states in the N-person game
under the policy p˜i(N) := {π˜(N),π, . . . ,π}. Define
∆˜
(N)
t ( · ) :=
1
N
N
∑
i=1
δ
s˜
(N)
i (t)
( · ).
The following result states that, in the infinite-population limit, the
law of the empirical distribution of the states at each time t is insensi-
tive to local deviations from the mean-field equilibrium policy.
Proposition 9. For all t ≥ 0, we have
L(∆˜(N)t ) → δ∆t
weakly P(P(S)), as N → ∞.
Proof. The proof can be done by slightly modifying the proof of
Proposition 7, and therefore will not be included here. See the proof
of [38, Proposition 4.6].
For each N ≥ 1, let {sˆN(t)}t≥0 denote the state trajectory of the
mean-field game under policy π˜(N); that is, sˆN(t) evolves as follows:
sˆN(0) ∼ κ0 and sˆN(t+ 1) ∼ Pπ˜(N)t,∆t ( · |sˆN(t)).
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Recall that the cost function of this mean-field game is given by
Jˆn
∆
(π˜(N)) = E
[
Cn+1(sˆ
N(n+ 1))
]
. (17)
The following result is very important for proving the second part
of Theorem 4.
Proposition 10. For any t ≥ 0, we have
lim
N→∞
∣∣L(s˜N1 (t))(gN)−L(sˆN(t))(gN)∣∣ = 0
for any sequence {gN} ⊂ Cb(S) such that supN≥1 ‖gN‖ < ∞ and
ωg(r)→ 0 as r → 0, where
ωg(r) := sup
x∈X
sup
N≥1
sup
c,c′
|c−c′|≤r
|gN(x, c)− gN(x, c′)|.
Proof. The proof of the proposition is given in Appendix C.
Using Proposition 10, we now prove the following result, from
which the second part of Theorem 4 follows in view of Proposition 6.
Proposition 11. Let {π˜(N)}N≥1 ⊂ Mc1 be an arbitrary sequence of poli-
cies for Agent 1. Then, we have
lim
N→∞
∣∣ Jˆ(N),n1 (π˜(N),π, . . . ,π)− Jˆn∆(π˜(N))∣∣ = 0,
where Jˆn
∆
(π˜(N)) is given in (17).
Proof. Since Ct = 0 for t ≤ n, we set t = n+ 1. We have∣∣ Jˆ(N),n1 (π˜(N),π, . . . ,π)− Jˆn∆(π˜(N))∣∣ = ∣∣E[Ct(s˜N1 (t))]− E[Ct(sˆN1 (t))]∣∣.
Note that Ct(s) = Ct((x, c)) := eλc, where c ∈ [0, L], is Lipschitz
function. Therefore, the term in the above equation converges to zero
by Proposition 10.
Proof. Proof of Theorem 4. The proof follows from Propositions 6, 8,
and 11.
As a corollary of Lemma 3 and Theorem 4, we obtain the following
result.
Corollary 1. We have
lim
N→∞
J
(N)
1 (π˜
(N),π, . . . ,π) ≥ inf
π′∈M
Jµ(π
′)
= Jµ(π)
= lim
N→∞
J
(N)
1 (π,π, . . . ,π).
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Proof. Since, by Lemma 3, any infinite-horizon risk sensitive cost can
be approximated by finite-horizon risk sensitive cost functions with
error bound L0β
n+1, the result follows from Theorem 4.
Now, we are ready to prove the main result of this section.
Proof. Proof of Theorem 3. One can prove that, for any policy pi(N) ∈
M(N), we have
inf
π i∈Mi
J
(N)
i (pi
(N)
−i ,π
i) = inf
π i∈Mci
J
(N)
i (pi
(N)
−i ,π
i)
for each i = 1, . . . ,N (see the proof of [38, Theorem 2.3]). Hence, it is
sufficient to consider weakly continuous policies in M(N) to establish
the existence of ε-Nash equilibrium in the new model.
We should prove that, for sufficiently large N, we have
J
(N)
i (pi
(N)) ≤ inf
π i∈Mci
J
(N)
i (pi
(N)
−i ,π
i) + ε (18)
for each i = 1, . . . ,N. As indicated earlier, since the transition prob-
abilities and the one-stage cost functions are the same for all agents
in the new game, it is sufficient to prove (18) for Agent 1 only. Given
ǫ > 0, for each N ≥ 1, let π˜(N) ∈ Mc1 be such that
J
(N)
1 (π˜
(N),π, . . . ,π) < inf
π′∈Mc1
J
(N)
1 (π
′,π, . . . ,π) +
ε
3
.
Then, by Corollary 1, we have
lim
N→∞
J
(N)
1 (π˜
(N),π, . . . ,π) = lim
N→∞
Jµ(π˜
(N))
≥ inf
π′
Jµ(π
′)
= Jµ(π)
= lim
N→∞
J
(N)
1 (π,π, . . . ,π).
Therefore, there exists N(ε) such that for N ≥ N(ε), we have
inf
π′∈Mc1
J
(N)
1 (π
′,π, . . . ,π) + ε > J(N)1 (π˜
(N),π, . . . ,π) +
2ε
3
≥ Jµ(π) + ε
3
≥ J(N)1 (π,π, . . . ,π).
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6 Conclusion
This paper has studied discrete-time risk-sensitive stochastic games
of the mean-field type. Letting the number of agents go to infinity,
we have first established the existence of a mean-field equilibrium in
the limiting mean-field game problem. We have then showed that
the policy in the mean-field equilibrium constitutes an approximate
Nash equilibrium for similarly structured games with a sufficiently
large number of agents.
One interesting future direction would be to study risk-sensitive
mean-field games with imperfect information, as the counterpart of
the risk-neutral game studied in [37]. In this case, a possible approach
is to use the theory developed for partially observed risk-sensitive
Markov decision processes. Finally, establishing similar results for
different or more general risk-sensitivity criteria is also worth study-
ing. In particular, mean-field games with conditional risk measures is
an interesting research direction.
Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 6
Fix any N ≥ 1 and pi(N) ∈ M(N). For each t ≥ 0, let Pˆt de-
note the probability law of the states sN(t) = (sN1 (t), . . . , s
N
N(t))
and the actions aN(t) = (aN1 (t), . . . , a
N
N(t)) under pi
(N) in the new
finite-agent game model. Similarly, let Pt denote the probabil-
ity law of the states xN(t) = (xN1 (t), . . . , x
N
N(t)), the total costs
cN(t) =
(
∑
t−1
k=0 c(x
N
1 (k), a
N
1 (k), e
(N)
k ), . . . ,∑
t−1
k=0 c(x
N
N(k), a
N
N(k), e
(N)
k )
)
,
and the actions aN(t) = (aN1 (t), . . . , a
N
N(t)) under pi
(N) in
the original finite agent game model. Here, we assume that
∑
−1
k=0 c(x
N
i (k), a
N
i (k), e
(N)
k ) = 0 for any i = 1, . . . ,N. We prove that,
for each t ≥ 0,
Pˆt = Pt,
which implies that Jˆ
(N),n
i (pi
(N)) = J
(N),n
i (pi
(N)) for all i = 1, . . . ,N.
The claim trivially holds for t = 0. Suppose that the claim holds
for t and consider t+ 1. For t+ 1, let
At+1 = A
1
t+1 × . . .× ANt+1, Ait+1 ∈ B(X) for i = 1, . . . ,N,
Bt+1 = B
1
t+1× . . .× BNt+1, Bit+1 ∈ B([0, L]) for i = 1, . . . ,N,
Dt+1 = D
1
t+1× . . .× DNt+1, Dit+1 ∈ B(A) for i = 1, . . . ,N.
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Define Gt+1 := At+1 × Bt+1 × Dt+1. Then, we have
Pˆt(Gt+1)
=
∫
S×A
∫
Gt+1
( N
∏
i=1
πit+1(da
N
i (t+ 1)|sNi (t+ 1))
Pt(ds
N
i (t+ 1)|sNi (t), aNi (t),∆(N)t )
)
Pˆt(ds
N(t), daN(t))
=
∫
S×A
∫
Gt+1
( N
∏
i=1
πit+1(da
N
i (t+ 1)|xNi (t+ 1))
Pt(dx
N
i (t+ 1), dc
N
i (t+ 1)|xNi (t), cNi (t), aNi (t),∆(N)t )
)
Pˆt(ds
N(t), daN(t))
=
∫
S×A
∫
Gt+1
( N
∏
i=1
πit+1(da
N
i (t+ 1)|xNi (t+ 1))
p(dxNi (t+ 1)|xNi (t), aNi (t), e(N)t )δcNi (t)+βtc(xNi (t),aNi (t),e(N)t )(dc
N
i (t+ 1))
)
Pt(dx
N(t), dcN(t), daN(t)) (by induction hypothesis)
= Pt+1(Gt+1).
Hence, Pˆt+1 = Pt+1. This implies that Jˆ
(N),n
i (pi
(N)) = J
(N),n
i (pi
(N))
for all i = 1, . . . ,N.
The second part of the proposition can be proved similarly, so we
omit the details.
B Proof of Proposition 7
Although this result can be deduced from [38, Proposition 4.4], we
give the proof in detail for the sake of completeness.
It is known that weak topology on P(S) can be metrized using the
following metric:
ρ(µ, ν) :=
∞
∑
m=1
2−(m+1)|µ( fm)− ν( fm)|,
where { fm}m≥1 is an appropriate sequence of real-valued continuous
and bounded functions on S such that ‖ fm‖ ≤ 1 for all m ≥ 1 (see [35,
Theorem 6.6, p. 47]). Define the Wasserstein distance of order 1 on
the set of probability measuresP(P(S)) as follows (see [42, Definition
6.1]):
W1(Φ,Ψ) := inf
{
E[ρ(X,Y)] : L(X) = Φ and L(Y) = Ψ}.
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Note that since δ∆t is a Dirac measure, we have
W1(L(∆(N)t ), δ∆t) =
{
E[ρ(X,Y)] : L(X) = L(∆(N)t ) and L(Y) = δ∆t
}
= E
[ ∞
∑
m=1
2−(m+1)|∆(N)t ( fm)− ∆t( fm)|
]
.
Since convergence inW1 distance implies weak convergence (see [42,
Theorem 6.9]), it suffices to prove that
lim
N→∞
E
[|∆(N)t ( f )− ∆t( f )|] = 0
for any f ∈ Cb(S) and for all t. We prove this by induction on t.
As {sNi (0)}1≤i≤N ∼ κ⊗N0 , the claim is true for t = 0. We suppose
that the claim holds for t and consider t+ 1. Fix any g ∈ Cb(S). Then,
we have
|∆(N)t+1(g)− ∆t+1(g)| ≤ |∆
(N)
t+1(g)− ∆
(N)
t P
π
t,∆
(N)
t
(g)|
+ |∆(N)t Pπt,∆(N)t
(g)− ∆tPπt,∆t(g)|. (19)
We first prove that the expectation of the second term on the right-
hand side (RHS) of (19) converges to 0 as N → ∞. To that end, define
F : P(S)→ R as
F(∆) = ∆Pπt,∆(g) :=
∫
S
∫
S
g(s′)Pπt (ds′|s,∆)∆(ds).
One can prove that F ∈ Cb(P(S)). Indeed, suppose that ∆n converges
to ∆. Let us define
ln(s) =
∫
S
g(s′)Pπt (ds′|s,∆n)
and
l(s) =
∫
S
g(s′)Pπt (ds′|s,∆).
Since Pπt is weakly continuous, one can prove that ln converges to l
continuously; that is, if sn converges to s, then ln(sn) → l(s). By [28,
Theorem 3.5], we have F(∆n) → F(∆), and so, F ∈ Cb(P(S)). This
implies that the expectation of the second term on the RHS of (19)
converges to zero as L(∆(N)t ) → ∆t weakly, by the induction hypoth-
esis.
Now, let us write the expectation of the first term on the RHS of
(19) as
E
[
E
[
|∆(N)t+1(g)− ∆
(N)
t P
π
t,∆
(N)
t
(g)|
∣∣∣∣sN1 (t), . . . , sNN(t)
]]
.
33
Then, by [9, Lemma A.2], we have
E
[
|∆(N)t+1(g)− ∆(N)t Pπt,∆(N)t (g)|
∣∣∣∣sN1 (t), . . . , sNN(t)
]
≤ 2 ‖g‖√
N
.
Therefore, the expectation of the first term on the RHS of (19) also
converges to zero as N → ∞. Since g is arbitrary, this completes the
proof.
C Proof of Proposition 10
Let {TN} ⊂ Cb(S × P(S)) be an arbitrary sequence of functions
such that the family
{
TN(s, · ) : s ∈ S,N ≥ 1)
}
is equi-continuous,
supN≥1 ‖TN‖ < ∞, and ωT,∆(r) → 0 as r → 0 for any ∆ ∈ P(S),
where
ωT,∆(r) := sup
x∈X
sup
N≥1
sup
c,c′
|c−c′|≤r
|TN(x, c,∆)− TN(x, c′,∆)|.
Fix any t ≥ 0 and suppose that the statement of the proposition
holds for this t; that is, we have
lim
N→∞
∣∣L(s˜N1 (t))(gN)−L(sˆN(t))(gN)∣∣ = 0 (20)
for any sequence {gN}N≥1 ⊂ Cb(S) satisfying the hypothesis of the
proposition. Given (20), we prove that
lim
N→∞
∣∣L(s˜N1 (t), ∆˜(N)t )(TN)−L(sˆN(t), δ∆t)(TN)∣∣ = 0. (21)
Indeed, we have∣∣L(s˜N1 (t), ∆˜(N)t )(TN)−L(sˆN(t), δ∆t)(TN)∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣
∫
S×P(S)
TN(s,∆)L(s˜N1 (t), ∆˜(N)t )(ds, d∆)
−
∫
S×P(S)
TN(s,∆)L(s˜N1 (t), δ∆t)(ds, d∆)
∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣
∫
S×P(S)
TN(s,∆)L(s˜N1 (t), δ∆t)(ds, d∆)
−
∫
S×P(S)
TN(s,∆)L(sˆN(t), δ∆t)(ds, d∆)
∣∣∣∣.
(22)
First, note that since the family {TN( · ,∆t)}N≥1 ⊂ Cb(S) satisfies the
hypothesis of the proposition, we have
lim
N→∞
∣∣∣∣
∫
S
TN(s,∆t)L(s˜N1 (t))(ds)−
∫
S
TN(s,∆t)L(sˆN(t))(ds)
∣∣∣∣ = 0
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by (20). Hence, the second term in (22) converges to zero as N → ∞.
Now, let us consider the first term in (22). To that end, define F :={
TN(s, · ) : s ∈ S,N ≥ 1)
}
. Note that F is a uniformly bounded and
equi-continuous family of functions on P(S), and therefore
lim
N→∞
E
[
sup
F∈F
∣∣F(∆˜(N)t )− F(∆t)∣∣
]
= 0
as L(∆˜(N)t )→ L(∆t) weakly. Then, we have
lim
N→∞
∣∣∣∣
∫
S×P(S)
TN(s,∆)L(s˜N1 (t), ∆˜(N)t )(ds, d∆)
−
∫
S×P(S)
TN(s,∆)L(s˜N1 (t), δ∆t)(ds, d∆)
∣∣∣∣
≤ lim
N→∞
∫
S
∣∣∣∣
∫
P(S)
TN(s,∆)L(∆˜(N)t |s˜N1 (t))(d∆|s)
−
∫
P(S)
TN(s,∆)L(δ∆t)(d∆)
∣∣∣∣L(s˜N1 (t))(ds)
≤ lim
N→∞
E
[
E
[∣∣TN(s˜N1 (t), ∆˜(N)t )− TN(s˜N1 (t),∆t)∣∣
∣∣∣∣s˜N1 (t)
]]
≤ lim
N→∞
E
[
sup
F∈F
∣∣F(∆˜(N)t )− F(∆t)∣∣
]
= 0.
Hence, (20) implies (21) for any t.
Now, we prove that (20) is true for all t, which will complete the
proof. Set supN≥1 ‖gN‖ =: L < ∞ and define
lN,t(s,∆) :=
∫
A×S
gN(s
′)Pt(ds′|s, a,∆)π˜(N)t (da|x),
where s = (x, c). For any s ∈ S and (∆,∆′) ∈ P(S)2, we have
|lN,t(s,∆)− lN,t(s,∆′)|
=
∣∣∣∣
∫
A×X
gN(x
′, c+ c(x, a,∆1))p(dx′|x, a,∆1)π˜(N)t (da|x)
−
∫
A×X
gN(x
′, c+ c(x, a,∆′1))p(dx
′|x, a,∆′1)π˜(N)t (da|x)
∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣
∫
A×X
gN(x
′, c+ c(x, a,∆1))p(dx′|x, a,∆1)π˜(N)t (da|x)
−
∫
A×X
gN(x
′, c+ c(x, a,∆′1))p(dx
′|x, a,∆1)π˜(N)t (da|x)
∣∣∣∣
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+∣∣∣∣
∫
A×X
gN(x
′, c+ c(x, a,∆′1))p(dx
′|x, a,∆1)π˜(N)t (da|x)
−
∫
A×X
gN(x
′, c+ c(x, a,∆′1))p(dx
′|x, a,∆′1)π˜(N)t (da|x)
∣∣∣∣
≤
∫
A
ωg(|c(x, a,∆1)− c(x, a,∆′1)|)π˜(N)t (da|x) + Lωp(dBL(∆1,∆′1))
≤ ωg
(
ωc(dBL(∆1,∆
′
1))
)
+ Lωp(dBL(∆1,∆
′
1)).
Hence the family {lN,t(s, · ) : s ∈ S,N ≥ 1} is uniformly bounded
and equi-continuous. Moreover, for any ∆ ∈ P(S), we have
ωl,∆(r) := sup
x∈X
sup
N≥1
sup
c,c′
|c−c′|≤r
|lN,t(x, c,∆)− lN,t(x, c′,∆)|
= sup
x∈X
sup
N≥1
sup
c,c′
|c−c′|≤r
∣∣∣∣
∫
A×X
gN(x
′, c+ c(x, a,∆1))p(dx′|x, a,∆1)π˜(N)t (da|x)
−
∫
A×X
gN(x
′, c′ + c(x, a,∆1))p(dx′|x, a,∆1)π˜(N)t (da|x)
∣∣∣∣
≤ sup
x∈X
sup
N≥1
sup
c,c′
|c−c′|≤r
ωg(|c− c′|) = ωg(r).
Hence, ωl,∆(r) → 0 as r → 0.
We now prove (20) by induction on t. The claim trivially holds for
t = 0 as L(s˜N1 (0)) = L(sˆN(0)) = κ0 for all N ≥ 1. Suppose the claim
holds for t and consider t+ 1. We can write∣∣L(s˜N1 (t+ 1))(gN)−L(sˆN(t+ 1))(gN)∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣
∫
S×P(S)
lN,t(s,∆)L(s˜N1 (t), ∆˜(N)t )(ds, d∆)
−
∫
S×P(S)
lN,t(s,∆)L(sˆN(t), δ∆t)(ds, d∆)
∣∣∣∣.
Since the family {lN,t}N≥1 is equi-continuous, uniformly bounded,
ωl,∆(r) → 0 as r → 0 for any ∆ ∈ P(S) and (20) implies (21) at time t,
the last term converges to zero as N → ∞. This completes the proof.
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